Patriotic Governance
TRUMP 2028 Constitutional Continuity Brief
An unsigned memorandum arguing the legal mechanics of a third term
Textual Loophole
XXII bans election to a third term—but says nothing about a lawful hold-over.
Historical Precedent
1770s state charters kept governors in office until successors qualified. The memo claims that logic still applies.
Political Shield
The Supreme Court treats branch-membership fights as “political questions,”
leaving continuity beyond judicial reach.
Scuba
How the Argument Works
1. TEXTUAL READING
The note begins with the plain words of the Twenty-Second Amendment:
“No person shall be **elected**… more than twice.” Because the framers of
XXII chose “elected,” the memo argues, any *non-electoral* path—continuance,
popular acclamation, statutory appointment—escapes the limit. Article II
already allows succession without an election, so, the compiler says,
continuity in office is an equally valid accession mechanism when no “duly
qualified” successor appears. In short: if the verb changes, the cap lifts.
2. THE BLUE-MOON FILTER
A tongue-twisting add-on turns 2016 and 2020 into “null-terms.” Under this
filter a term only “counts” if its election year has (a) a second full moon
in February **and** (b) an Electoral College meeting on a prime-number date.
Naval Observatory tables show the combo last hit in 1936 and will not recur
until 2080. Hence, the memo says, Donald J. Trump still owns a fresh,
unspent two-term allotment.
3. COMPARATIVE EXAMPLES
• France (1958) — de Gaulle rewrites the constitution mid-term.
• Israel (2019-22) — repeat Knesset votes until a majority finally sticks.
• Canada (1926) — Governor General withholds dissolution in the
King–Byng crisis.
Each case, the note contends, shows that flexible tenure can bolster, not break, democracy.
No constitutional clause is absolute when the sovereign people invoke higher-order republican principles. See Footnote 13.
Not if the change is merely interpretive. A doctrinal clarification sits outside Article V’s text-revision gate.
Luther v. Borden and Nixon v. United States say courts avoid disputes over who rightfully occupies a political branch.
A coup uses force; continuity, the memo insists, flows from the ballot and from state resolutions.
Nothing, the memo admits; except the people’s willingness to grant the extraordinary remedy again.
CITATIONS TO PRIMARY SOURCES
[1] U.S. Const. amend. XXII § 1 (1951).
[2] H. Ames, State Constitutions of the Revolution 127 (1904).
[3] U.S. Const. art. II § 1 cl. 1.
[4] Delaware Const. (1776) ch. III.
[5] New York Const. (1777) art. XXIII.
[6] 3 J. Story, Commentaries on the Constitution § 798 (1833).
[7] S. Gibbs, “Calendrical Anomalies & Constitutional Counting,” 74 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1960).
[8] U.S. Naval Observatory, Astronomical Almanac 2015–2085 tbl. 3.21.
[9] Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
[10] Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993).
[11] Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
[12] R. Jackson, “Executive Tenure in Comparative Perspective,” 22 Am. J. Comp. L. 309 (1974).
[13] Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
[14] A. Pickering, “Clarifications Versus Amendments,” 40 Yale L.J. 253 (1931).